In this talk Alexandre will present his research with Prof Daniel Crane (Michigan Law School) on competition law and fascism. By looking at the case of fascism in Spain, the hypothesis that the authors are testing is whether market concentration facilitates the raise of authoritarian regimes. Please join us via Zoom: https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/69718410739
Does industrial concentration facilitate the rise of authoritarian regimes? Recent debates regarding the relationship between antitrust enforcement, bigness and the health of democracy have brought this question to the fore. Most of the literature so far has focused on the example of the Nazi regime and the relationship between the existence of powerful German cartels in the 20th century and the rise of Hitler, and it seems that there is a link between market concentration and the consolidation of the Nazi cabinet in power. The question is whether this hypothesis holds true when it comes to other authoritarian regimes, such as in Fascist Spain.
Alexandre Ruiz Feases is a post-doctoral researcher at LTMS (home of TILT and TILEC) at Tilburg University, working mainly on EU competition law. He has conducted his PhD at the European University Institute (thesis defense still pending) under the supervision of Prof Giorgio Monti. In 2018 he was also a Grotius Scholar at Michigan Law School.